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WITTGENSTEIN, ETHICS AND 
LITERATURE
The case of Tolstoy’s tale Hadji Murat
In his memoir of Wittgenstein, Paul Engelmann says that the 
conversations about literature that he had with him were the 
most profound influence that he received from the then young 
philosopher1. And Von Wright, in his early ‘Biographical Sketch’, 
declared that throughout his life Wittgenstein received deeper 
impressions from ‘some writers in the borderland between 
philosophy, religion, and poetry’ – such as Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy 
– than from the philosophers2. I think that in Wittgenstein, unlike
other philosophers in his circle with whom he is usually associated, 
there is an internal relation between his philosophy and literature, 
and that the latter is not merely a source of illustrations of the 
former. For his style, his particular way of expressing himself, is 
not without importance in his philosophical ‘substance’, in his 
movements of thought.
In 1931 he noted:
If it is said on occasion that (someone’s) philosophy is a matter 
of temperament, there is some truth in this. A preference for 
certain comparisons (Gleichnisse) is something we call a matter of 
temperament & far more disagreements rest on this than appears at 
first sight.3
1 Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a memoir (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1967), p. 82.
2 Georg Henrik von Wright, ‘Biographical Sketch’, in Norman Malcolm, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001), 
p. 19.
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 18 
(1931).
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The internal connection between literature and Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is especially notable in the case of ethics and religion. 
These aspects of his thought are not always discernible in someone 
who, according to the well-known testimony of his friend and 
follower Drury, said that although he was not a man of religion he 
could not help seeing any matter from a religious point of view4. 
Well, the aim of this essay is very limited: to show the relationship 
with literature adopted by Wittgenstein’s moral temperament, 
for this purpose considering only Tolstoy’s novella Hadji Murat, 
for which he always displayed a lively interest. I shall justify my 
choice.
There are already several studies that deal with Wittgenstein’s 
interpretation of Tolstoy. But when it comes to considering the 
relation between them the exegesis tends to come to a halt and 
to elaborate on the influence that The Gospel in Brief had on the 
author of the Tractatus in the time of the Great War. However, 
Wittgenstein’s dialogue with the Russian author goes far beyond 
that text of religious and moral criticism (which, for Tolstoy, are 
two sides of the same coin). In fact, there are various testimonies 
which show that Tolstoy’s works were a constant point of reference 
for Wittgenstein’s thinking and reworking of his moral and 
religious points of view throughout his life. In his recollections of 
their conversations about religion during the war (Olmütz, 1916), 
Engelmann describes the interpretation that the two of them 
made of the short story ‘Two Old Men’. He confessed to Drury that 
recently only two European writers had had anything important 
to say about religion: Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. He recommended 
Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov and also Crime and 
Punishment. And among Tolstoy’s works he recommended the 
folk tales included in a book called Twenty-Three Tales, one of 
which is the story ‘Two Old Men’ to which Engelmann refers. 
When Drury later confessed to him that he preferred Dostoyevsky 
to Tolstoy, Wittgenstein disagreed vehemently and declared that 
Tolstoy’s short stories would always survive, that they were written 
for everybody and that he preferred ‘The Three Hermits’.
4 Maurice O’Connor Drury, ‘Some Notes on Conversations with 
Wittgenstein’, in Ludwig Wittgenstein. Personal Recollections, ed. by Rush 
Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), p. 94. 
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I am especially interested in the testimony of his friend 
Norman Malcolm in the mid 1940s. In a letter written at the end 
of the Second World War, Malcolm complained of the boredom 
of being mobilised on a warship. In his reply dated 26 June 1945 
Wittgenstein compared the war to a school. If a pupil says that the 
school is boring it is because he is incapable of learning what is 
taught at the school.
I can’t help believing that an enormous lot can be learnt about 
human beings in this war – if you can keep your eyes open. And the 
better you are at thinking the more you’ll get out of what you see. For 
thinking is digesting. If I’m writing in a preaching tone I’m just an 
ass! but the fact remains that if you’re bored a lot it means that your 
mental digestion isn’t what it should be.
I think a good remedy for this is sometimes opening your eyes 
wider. Sometimes a book helps a little, e.g. T.’s ‘Hadshi Murat’ 
wouldn’t be bad.5
In a later letter Wittgenstein is glad that Malcolm has obtained 
the novella Hadji Murat and tells him ‘I hope you’ll get a lot out 
of it, because there is a lot in it.’ As for Tolstoy, he says: ‘There’s 
a real man; who has a right to write’6. Malcolm also says that 
Wittgenstein had an ‘extremely favourable’ opinion of Tolstoy’s 
folk tales, that he was very pleased that he knew those stories, 
and that ‘he questioned me closely to find out whether I had 
understood the moral of the one entitled “How Much Land Does 
A Man Need?”’7 However, despite his very favourable opinion 
of Tolstoy, when Malcolm commented that he had been very 
impressed by a passage in Resurrection, Wittgenstein replied, at 
the end of 1945:
I once tried to read Resurrection but couldn’t. You see, when 
Tolstoy just tells a story he impresses me infinitely more than when 
he addresses the reader. When he turns his back to the reader then 
he seems to me most impressive. Perhaps one day we can talk about 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 
1911–1951, ed. by Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 379.
6 Ibid., p. 383.
7 Malcolm, p. 45.
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this. It seems to me his philosophy is most true when it’s latent in 
the story.8
From all this we can draw some conclusions. Wittgenstein 
considered that Tolstoy’s short stories expressed a moral teaching, 
that they could be read and understood by everyone, and that 
because of the teaching they conveyed their applicability was 
very wide. Moreover, Wittgenstein considered that this form of 
expression, in which the moral teaching was latent, was ‘philosophy’. 
It is significant that immediately after the last sentence in the 
passage just quoted (‘It seems to me his philosophy is most true 
when it’s latent in the story’), Wittgenstein continues: ‘Talking of 
philosophy: my book is gradually nearing its final form …’, etc.
*
The case of the novella Hadji Murat is rather special. It is not 
a long novel like War and Peace, Anna Karenina or Resurrection, 
but it is also not a short story or tale in the form of a parable like 
the ones in Twenty-Three Tales. All the same, Wittgenstein read 
this novella and recommended it repeatedly throughout his life. In 
the summer of 1912 he wrote to Russell: ‘I have just read Chadschi-
Murat by Tolstoy! Have you ever read it? If not, you ought to for it is 
wonderful’9. And if he recommended it to Malcolm in time of war in 
order to help him to learn about human beings, he also suggested 
it to his sister Gretl, apparently too insistently, because in a letter 
probably written at the end of 1945 she replied: ‘No my dear I am 
surely not going to read Hadschi Murad again. I could not stand 
it’10. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein read this novella several 
8 Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein in Cambridge, p. 385. My italics. Malcolm had 
told him that he had been impressed by the start of chapter 59 in part I, in 
which Tolstoy criticises the idea that men are easy to classify morally once 
and for all: ‘Every man bears within him the germs of every human 
quality, and now manifests one, now another, and frequently is 
quite unlike himself, while still remaining the same man.’ Tolstoy, 
Resurrection, quoted in Malcolm, p. 99.
9 Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein in Cambridge, p. 35.
10 Unpublished letter from Gretl Wittgenstein to her brother Ludwig. Brian 
McGuiness, to whom I am grateful for providing me with it, dates it as 27 
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times. On 25 June 1945, many years after he had recommended it to 
Russell and at about the time of his correspondence with Malcolm 
and with his sister about it, he wrote to Rees: ‘I read a wonderful 
book these days: Hadshi Murat by Tolstoy. Do you know it? If you 
don’t I’ll try to get a copy for you’11. 
What moral philosophy was expressed by this novella that 
Wittgenstein liked so much? It is not easy to ascertain, because, 
as far as I am aware, he did not make any substantive declaration 
about the teaching that it embodied. For the time being I shall not 
answer my own question – supposing that it has an answer. But I 
shall begin to do so indirectly by referring very briefly to other folk 
tales by Tolstoy that Wittgenstein is known to have recommended. 
At first sight, they are all in agreement with his religious and 
moral conceptions, but it is not easy to discern the teaching that, 
according to Wittgenstein, could be deduced from each of them.
In ‘How Much Land Does A Man Need?’, the main character 
falls into the hands of the devil as a result of considering the 
consumption of goods encouraged by modern cities to be an 
essential objective, and of his insatiable desire to earn more than 
is needed for a dignified, austere life and his compulsion to acquire 
property in order to attain higher social status, in other words, as a 
result of considering material riches to be an absolute value. All of 
which leads to conflict with his neighbours, a constant rootlessness, 
an insuperable dissatisfaction and a sense of ill-being and, finally, 
to his death. At the end of this story Tolstoy provides the answer: 
‘Six feet from his head to his heels was all he needed’12. The case 
of ‘The Three Hermits’ is similar. A bishop – in other words, an 
authority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy – finds three hermits who 
are living on an island for the salvation of their souls. They do 
almost everything in silence and need little more than a glance 
to understand one another. The people think they are stupid. The 
bishop declares that he is ‘called, by God’s mercy’ to teach them. 
The hermits say that they do not know how to serve God. ‘We only 
October, probably 1945 (published electronically in Gesamtbriefwechsel by 
Intelex).
11 Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein in Cambridge, p. 378.
12 Leo Tolstoy, ‘How Much Land Does A Man Need?’, in Leo Tolstoy, Twenty-
Three Tales (London: Henry Frowde and Oxford University Press, 1906), p. 
176.
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serve and support ourselves,’ they say. When they are asked how 
they pray they raise their arms and recite a cheerful refrain, ‘Three 
are ye, three are we, have mercy upon us’13. The bishop, believing 
that they are referring to the Holy Trinity, gives them a lesson on 
theology and tries to teach them to say the Lord’s Prayer in the 
prescribed form. Yet, however much they try, the hermits keep 
forgetting the prayer as soon as they stop repeating it. The story 
emphasises the fact that they are holy men by having them walk 
upon the water to catch up with the bishop and ask him to repeat 
the Lord’s Prayer again to see if they can stop forgetting it. Now 
it might be said that Wittgenstein’s liking for this story reflects 
the negative opinion that he had of an experience of religious 
belief in the form it takes in organized religion, and his conviction 
that ‘looking after oneself ’, acquiring mastery of oneself, is an 
unavoidable moral imperative, and that in the case of religious 
expressions it is not a question of whether they are true, false or 
nonsensical14, because what is important is not the literality of 
what they say but the attitude to life that they express.
In any case, it is not easy to define the moral teaching that 
these parable-like stories contain and that, according to Malcolm, 
Wittgenstein wished, by means of acute questions, to make sure 
that he had grasped. At this point, an example and a warning are 
provided by Engelmann’s recollections of the comments that the 
two of them made about the story ‘Two Old Men’. In principle, the 
moral has to do with the experience of religion as an ecclesiastic 
rite, and again with criticism of the way in which religious belief 
is administered politically, and with the wrongness of considering 
religious statements as historical truths about events that took 
place in a particular place in the remote past. The story describes 
the journey of two poor peasant pilgrims who set off for Jerusalem. 
13 Leo Tolstoy, ‘The Three Hermits’, in Tolstoy, Twenty-Three Tales, p. 153.
14 In the conversation with Friedrich Waismann about Schlick’s ethics 
Wittgenstein said: ‘I can quite well imagine a religion in which there are 
no doctrines, and hence nothing is said. Obviously the essence of religion 
can have nothing to do with the fact that speech occurs – or rather if the 
speech does occur, this itself is a component of religious behavior and not 
a theory. Therefore nothing turns on whether the words are true, false, or 
nonsensical.’ Wittgenstein, in Friedrich Waismann, ‘Notes on Talks with 
Wittgenstein’, The Philosophical Review, 74, no. 1 (1965), pp. 12-16 (p. 16).
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When one of them arrives he finds a spectacle that provides 
considerable profit to those who are in charge of the holy places. 
The other one does not reach Jerusalem because he stops to help 
a family of peasants who are on the point of dying of hunger. The 
narrative, which implicitly contains many of Tolstoy’s opinions 
about the genuine religious attitude, emphasizes that life and 
the preservation of humanity are sacred. However, the comment 
that Wittgenstein made – and that Engelmann transmitted – is 
disconcerting because it concerns a detail that is easy to overlook 
and that does not seem to be the centre of Tolstoy’s moral and 
religious teaching. Before the two peasants separate, the one who 
does not reach Jerusalem takes out his snuff box to inhale some 
snuff. The one who completes the pilgrimage reproaches him for 
indulging in a vice that is not fitting for a pilgrim, and the first one 
replies: ‘The evil habit is stronger than I’15. Engelmann says that in 
this acknowledgement Wittgenstein saw the true religious feeling: 
‘Instead of trying to excuse his action before himself and others 
as ‘not really sinful’, the peasant confessed having succumbed to 
sin’16. 
Therefore, although Wittgenstein considered that these stories 
could be read by everyone and that because of their moral teaching 
their applicability was very wide, it is not easy to ascertain what he 
thought about what this teaching was in each case. In fact, even 
the synopsis that I have given of the two stories described above 
does not do justice to many aspects that Tolstoy interweaves and 
that are in accord with other aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
For instance, the behaviour of the bishop and that of the peasant 
who is eager to increase his property are contrasted with attitudes 
and behaviour that, from the description of them, border on 
childishness or madness when viewed from the commonly 
accepted perspective of ‘order’. This is the case with the nonsensical 
prayer of the hermits who are so bad at remembering, a prayer 
that does not even respect agreement of number in its invocation: 
‘Three are ye, three are we, have mercy upon us’ (in the original 
Russian, the verb in ‘Three are ye’ is in the plural, whereas in ‘have 
15 Leo Tolstoy, ‘Two Old Men’, in Tolstoy, Twenty-Three Tales, p. 90. What 
Elisha says in Engelmann’s version is not ‘evil habit’ but ‘sin’.
16 Engelmann, p. 80.
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mercy upon us’ it is in the singular). But it is also the case with the 
Bashkirs in the story ‘How Much Land Does A Man Need?’ Their 
merry, jovial behaviour seems to reduce the idea of purchase and 
profit to absurdity, for they are willing to give away their land to 
the first person who asks for it as long as he is friendly and gives 
them presents. Thus both cases could express the opinion that 
Wittgenstein states in On Certainty §611: ‘Where two principles 
really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then 
each man declares the other a fool (Narr) and heretic’17. 
To put it briefly, these stories weave an intricate mesh of 
meaningful relations, of ‘floating’ significances, which go beyond 
what might at first sight seem a simple sermon and the meaning 
of which cannot easily be reduced. In the case of the relation of 
Wittgenstein’s moral and religious philosophy to the novella Hadji 
Murat, I think there is a difference that must be taken into account, 
the difference that exists between, on the one hand, something 
that is inexpressible by its very nature or character and, on the 
other, something that is latent because the author writes it in a 
particular way, turning ‘his back to the reader’, as Wittgenstein 
put it in his letter to Malcolm. The first part of this distinction 
seems to correspond to the period of the Tractatus, the second 
to that of the Philosophical Investigations. However, despite the 
profound changes that his conceptions about meaning underwent, 
Wittgenstein did not substantially vary either his moral point of 
view or his way of approaching Hadji Murat, as I will try to show.
*
In the period of the Tractatus and its austere pictorial theory 
of meaning, which condemns any moral or religious statement 
to senselessness, Wittgenstein thought that the way of speaking 
about what could not be said meaningfully was a ‘hopeless’ 
approximation by way of similes and allegories. This is the strategy 
that he defends to make himself understood by his audience in his 
‘Lecture on Ethics’:
17 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
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Now all religious terms seem in this sense to be used as similes or 
allegorically. For when we speak of God and that he sees everything 
and when we kneel and pray to him all our terms and actions seem to 
be parts of a great and elaborated allegory which represents him as a 
human being of great power whose grace we try to win, etc., etc. But 
this allegory also describes the experience which I have just referred 
to [To wonder at the existence of the world. N. S.]. For the first of 
them is, I believe, exactly what people were referring to when they 
said that God had created the world; and the experience of absolute 
safety has been described by saying that we feel safe in the hands 
of God. A third experience of the same kind is that of feeling guilty 
and again this was described by the phrase that disapproves of our 
conduct. Thus in ethical and religious language we seem constantly 
to be using similes.18
Wittgenstein considered that in ethical value judgements (and 
in religious expressions) we inadvertently make the mistake of 
thinking of absolute value judgements as being similar to relative 
value judgements. In relative value judgements we simply state a 
fact (a ‘good’ runner is one who runs at such and such a speed), 
whereas underlying absolute judgements there is a ‘characteristic’ 
misuse of these expressions: namely, using them as similes 
or allegories when there is nothing in the world to support the 
relation of similarity that they apparently establish. However, it is 
no less true that, at the same time, he thought that these pieces of 
nonsense bring us closer to, point to or show experiences of a kind 
that in turn draw limits to what, for him, constituted the sphere 
of ethics. Of the three experiences that Wittgenstein mentioned 
in that lecture – experiences of his, which were not the only ones 
and to which he did not seek to attribute the status of a universal 
principle – he considered the experience of wondering at the 
existence of the world as being ‘my experience par excellence’. Yet 
in this there is a paradox which he himself acknowledges: these 
experiences of his can be located in space and dated; in other 
words, they are events that occurred or that occur. How could they 
have an absolute value if the world as it is conceived in the period 
of the Tractatus is no more than an occurrence of events and 
18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, The Philosophical 
Review, 74, no. 1 (1965), pp. 3-12 (p. 9). (My emphasis.)
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there is no place for values? He himself says that he is ‘tempted’ to 
solve this paradox by saying that wondering at the existence of the 
world is similar to considering the world as a miracle. However, 
considering something as a miracle is, for him, simply considering 
a fact from a particular perspective, with a particular ‘way of 
looking’ (which is not science’s way of looking).
Therefore, we can conclude that what Tolstoy’s allegories 
offer us in the Tractatus period is not an explicit moral sermon 
but rather what is indicated by Wittgenstein’s comment about 
Uhland’s poem ‘Count Eberhard’s Hawthorn’: ‘if only you do not 
try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the 
unutterable will be – unutterably – contained in what has been 
uttered!’19 And in his recollections Engelmann sums up as follows: 
‘[…] the poem as a whole gives in 28 lines the picture of a life’20. So 
one might say that, in accordance with the conception of meaning 
in the Tractatus period, the inexpressible in language is offered 
in Tolstoy’s stories as a way of seeing, as a picture that establishes 
a perspective which changes the way in which life is considered. 
And thus Wittgenstein recommended Hadji Murat to Malcolm, 
to help him to ‘open his eyes’ (i.e., to see in a different way) and 
to learn about human beings in and from the war. The point is 
not that there is no moral ‘lesson’, the point is not that one has to 
learn from what is ‘absent’ in the text21. Rather, we have to learn 
something that is ‘contained’ in Tolstoy’s stories – or in Uhland’s 
poem – but that is offered for our consideration articulated in a 
particular way, as a picture from which a perspective is established.
However, there is something intriguing here. Although 
Wittgenstein abandoned the restrictive theory of meaning 
that appears in the Tractatus, he did not therefore abandon his 
preference for the latency of philosophy in Tolstoy’s narratives 
(and in general). In fact, his statement to Malcolm that the Russian 
writer seemed more expressive to him when he turns his back to 
19 Wittgenstein, letter to Engelmann, 9-4-17, in Engelmann. (Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis.)
20 Engelmann, p. 85. (My emphasis.)
21 On this point I do not agree with Cora Diamond. (Cf. Cora Diamond, 
‘Introduction to “Having a rough story about what moral philosophy is”’, 
in The Literary Wittgenstein, ed. by John Gibson and Wolfgang Huemer 
(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 128 ff.
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the reader – the more latent the philosophy, the truer it is – was 
made in the period when he was working on the Philosophical 
Investigations. In other words, when he considered that the 
particular grammar of religious and ethical language games did 
not make them less meaningful than any other. Cora Diamond 
says that ‘What Tolstoy does not tell us is how to think about 
Hadji Murat himself, his life and his death, or how to make what 
we think of Hadji Murat alive in our own lives’22. According to her, 
it is in this aspect that the Russian writer resembles the way in 
which Wittgenstein demanded that both the Tractatus and the 
Philosophical Investigations should be read. I do not agree with 
the statement about Tolstoy and Hadji Murat: the stories that 
Tolstoy wrote after A Confession are always didactically moralising. 
But what I am interested in emphasising here is that, although 
Wittgenstein maintained his distinction between ‘saying’ and 
‘showing’ beyond the pictorial theory from which it originated, 
and although it is true that in the case of moral philosophy he 
maintained his preference for allegory and latency, this does 
not eliminate the possibility of reconstructing some of the main 
features of his moral philosophy from his constant interest in 
Hadji Murat.
Yet there is a clarification that has to be made. So far I have 
used the term ‘moral philosophy’ ambiguously, but at this point 
it is necessary to remove the ambiguity. One can in fact make a 
distinction, at least a distinction of reason, between a moralist and 
a moral philosopher. The moral philosopher (or ethics) devotes 
himself with a great degree of detachment and lack of involvement 
to conceptual analysis of the language of morality, or to establishing 
its most abstract principles. The moralist seeks a moral code on 
the basis of which he acts and makes judgements, with which he 
engages and which spurs him on, which represents a conception 
of the meaning of life or a specification of what he understands by 
a good life. So, did Wittgenstein recommend that novella in order 
to think about ethics or to show its moral teaching?
At the time of the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ Wittgenstein mixed the 
two aspects together. On the one hand, he devoted himself to a 
clear conceptual analysis of moral language, to defining what he 
22 Diamond, p. 130.
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considered in that period to be a typical misuse of the expressions 
of ethics which is basically caused by overlooking the false analogy 
that we inadvertently make between absolute value judgements 
and relative value judgements. Moreover, he sought to clarify 
conceptually what he understood by ethics ‘in a slightly wider 
sense’ than that used by Moore in his Principia Ethica (which 
conceived it as ‘the general enquiry into what is good’). In order 
to indicate what he understood by ethics he offered a list of 
expressions that he considered equivalent: ethics is ‘the inquiry 
into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or 
into the right way of living’23. It is at this point – in order to show 
what is indicated by this set of expressions that would broaden the 
field of ethics beyond Moore’s concept – that he describes the three 
personal experiences that I mentioned earlier (wondering at the 
world, feeling absolutely safe, etc.). In other words, Wittgenstein 
stops speaking on the basis of a distanced conceptual analysis and 
chooses similes (many of a religious nature, as we have seen) that 
have to do with his personality and express his moral, rather than 
ethical, point of view. The conjunction of two texts from the same 
period, one written in 1930 and the other in 1931, shows what I 
am referring to. In the first, from the conversations with Friedrich 
Waismann about Schlick’s ethics (1930), he says:
At the end of my lecture on ethics, I spoke in the first person. I 
believe that is quite essential. Here nothing more can be established, 
I can only appear as a person speaking for myself.24 
But I have already cited, at the beginning, what he wrote a few 
months later:
If it is said on occasion that (someone’s) philosophy is a matter 
of temperament, there is some truth in this. A preference for 
certain comparisons (Gleichnisse) is something we call a matter of 
temperament & far more disagreements rest on this than appears at 
first sight.25 
23 Wittgenstein, ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, p. 5.
24 Wittgenstein, in Waismann, p. 16.
25 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 18 (1931).
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Well, I think that these two aspects, ethical and moral, are 
also mixed together in his interpretation of Hadji Murat after the 
Tractatus period. Moreover, as I have already said, I think that if 
we make a hermeneutic combination of Tolstoy’s story and the 
esoteric notes and jottings that Wittgenstein left it will be possible 
to discern his conception about the form of a correct way of 
living that would be worth living. So, what is the ‘picture of a life’ 
that is expressed in Hadji Murat and that Wittgenstein found so 
interesting?
*
The whole of Tolstoy’s novella could be considered as a 
Western, a film genre that he was very keen on, as his friends and 
biographers were aware26. In this case, however, life on the frontier 
is set in the northwest Caucasus, in Chechnya and Dagestan. 
An interminable frontier war in which the confrontation is not 
between the redskins of the prairies and the settlers of the West 
but between the mountain people and the Tsar’s army27. Yet in 
this confrontation between two worlds, two religions or two 
cultures there are many fractures and contradictions on both 
sides. Divisions that affect the various characters that appear in 
the story, people whose behaviour cannot be explained solely or 
mainly by the ethnic or religious community to which they belong. 
Although the gallery of characters is not as huge as that of War and 
Peace, it is nevertheless sufficient to show a range of individuals 
who, except on certain occasions, cannot easily be evaluated with 
regard to how they behave and the decisions that they take in such 
an extreme situation as war. It is true that from the outset there is 
an unjust situation: the invading army that considers the natives 
who live there as a bunch of savages and at times thinks of the 
war in terms of extermination, destroying entire villages and their 
26 Engelmann, pp. 91–92.
27 ‘What the Far West and the Red Man were to American mythology, the 
Caucasus and its warring tribes, or the unspoiled communities of Cossacks 
and Old Believers on the Don and the Volga were to Pushkin, Lermontov 
and Tolstoy.’ George Steiner, ‘Nineteenth-century America and Russia’, in 
George Steiner: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 134. 
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environment; there is also laughable behaviour, such as the official 
war reports, which convert the futile, accidental deaths of soldiers 
into patriotic discourses about militarily disastrous imaginary 
battles. Not to mention the disputes of prestige and caprices 
between the generals which lead to military ineffectiveness, 
death, and destruction. But that army is made up of a mixture of 
people, ranging from soldiers who are serfs in the izbas they come 
from to officers such as Butler, who makes a point of dressing in 
the style of the mountain people, with beshmet, cherkeska, and 
leggings, an officer who experiences the war in terms of sport and 
adventure, as an opportunity to display his manliness, and who 
is capable of admiring the warrior Hadji Murat and establishing 
a sincere friendship with him. Which means, Tolstoy says, that 
it is not possible for him to imagine ‘the other face’ of war: ‘To 
maintain his poetic view of war he even subconsciously avoided 
looking at the dead and wounded’28. On the other hand, a number 
of conflicts develop between different factions among the men 
of the mountains with the aim of gaining political leadership in 
their resistance against the Russians. We also find villages and 
individuals who avoid the fighting in order to achieve an easy-going 
modus vivendi and who therefore clash with the Muslim religious 
leaders, who understand their resistance as a ghazavat (holy war), 
and so on. In short, the story shows a wide range of conceptions 
of war and how it provides an extreme opportunity in which to 
consider the moral dilemmas that the characters have to face. So it 
is not strange that he recommended this book to Malcolm to help 
him to open his eyes and accept war as a privileged opportunity for 
learning ‘a lot’ about human beings.
Well, just as in a Western, the story presents – with the coldness 
and distance of an anthropological study – hatred and ambition, 
a thirst for vengeance, a blind desire to inflict death or injury on 
the enemy, treachery, but also loyalties based on unconditional 
personal and family attachments. All these attitudes and actions 
are attributed to Hadji Murat but also to his main enemy, Shamil, 
who paradoxically is not a Russian but a Chechen, a legendary 
guerrilla hero who led the resistance against the Russo-Tsarist 
28 Leo Tolstoy, Hadji Murat, in The Cossacks and Other Stories (London: 
Penguin Books, 2006), p. 420.
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conquest. Hadji Murat is a profoundly religious guerrilla fighter, 
even in his name, for in Persian ‘Hadji’ is the title given to 
someone who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once. 
He is a believer who nevertheless has changed the direction of his 
struggle many times. When Shamil rises up in a holy war against 
the Russians, the khans under whose protection Hadji Murat lives 
refuse to join in. But after becoming acquainted with the Russians 
in Tiflis (now Tbilisi), from whom he feels distant because he does 
not understand their ways of living, he advises his people to join 
the rebel leader. However, in order to gain total control over the 
villages under his command, Shamil disloyally and deceitfully kills 
the khans whom Hadji Murat considers his adoptive family. For 
this reason Hadji Murat goes over to the Russian side in order to 
protect his people and take vengeance on Shamil, and is appointed 
governor of Avaria by the invaders. Nevertheless, he soon changes 
this alliance. As a result of personal quarrels and questions of 
status, another mountain khan allied to the Russians, Akhmet-
Khan, denounces him and falsely accuses him of disloyalty and 
betrayal. The Russians pursue him, and he takes vengeance on the 
khan by kidnapping his wife, whom he respects and returns after 
payment of a ransom. He does not trust the Russians to admit the 
falseness of the accusation against him; moreover, he is briefly 
taken prisoner and is defiled by a Russian soldier before escaping. 
Thus he finds himself in a dilemma: he cannot join Shamil, who 
killed his people simply because of his ambition for power, and 
his customs require him to seek vengeance; he cannot join the 
Russians because they have dishonoured him (also, he does not 
trust their impartiality with regard to the unjust accusation that 
has been made against him)29. At this point, when he is fleeing 
from the Russians, the only thing that matters for him is to take 
vengeance on the person who accused him. Therefore he accepts 
the renewed invitation to join Shamil: this is the only way in which 
he will have a possibility of avenging himself on Akhmet-Khan, 
the ally of the Russian army. From then on, despite his lack of 
friendship or sympathy for Shamil, he becomes his second-in-
29 Tolstoy’s story makes it clear that this dishonour has a religious component: 
the man who defiled him, as the text gives us to understand, was a giaour; 
in Persian, a Christian among Muslims.
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command, fights ceaselessly against the invaders and carries out 
what his enemies consider as military feats. To such an extent 
that jealousy and the fear of losing power lead Shamil to wish to 
capture Hadji Murat alive or dead, and he forbids the Caucasian 
population, on pain of death, to provide him with aid. 
Hadji Murat decides to go over to the Russians once again and he 
promises them that he will kill Shamil or die. During his flight, some 
villagers fulfil their duty of hospitality despite the prohibition, and 
four or five men loyally follow him despite the repugnance they 
feel towards the Russians and their sympathy for Shamil’s cause. 
Thus another dilemma appears: as his mother, two wives and five 
children have been taken captive by Shamil, he cannot fulfil his 
promise until the Russians rescue them. But the invaders also do 
not keep their word: they do not trust the motive that causes Hadji 
Murat to join them and they do not have the military capacity for 
the rescue or any intention to exchange his family for prisoners. 
Once again Shamil offers to pardon him, but Hadji Murat decides 
to escape from the Russians to the mountains, fight against the 
rebel leader and rescue his family. So, during an excursion, he 
escapes with his loyal followers after mercilessly killing all but one 
of the few members of the small Russian escort that always keeps 
guard on him. He becomes a wanted man, a reward of a thousand 
roubles is offered for his head, and a hundred men, comprising 
Cossacks and local militia, set out after him. 
Hadji Murat and his men entrench themselves on a small island 
among the rice fields. Just when it seems that they are going to 
escape, their route is blocked by a party of bounty hunters from the 
mountains led by an old friend and by the son of Akhmet-Khan, 
the man who falsely accused him. They charge with their swords 
drawn, Hadji Murat and his men fire repeatedly, and one of them 
sings ‘La ilaha illa allah’ (‘There is no God but Allah’). The murids 
who accompanied him in his flight fall wounded and dead. He is 
hit by bullets twice, he gets up to charge with his dagger drawn, is 
felled, gets up again, and falls. Hadji-Aha, his former friend and 
now pursuer together with the Russians, strikes him with a dagger. 
Then, with his sword, he cuts off his head, which is to be passed 
from village to village. Thus ends Tolstoy’s novella.
In 1947 Wittgenstein jotted down a reflection that I think is 
enlightening:
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Someone reacts like this: he says ‘Not that!’ – & resists it. Out 
of this situations perhaps develop which are equally intolerable; & 
perhaps by then strength for any further revolt is exhausted. We say 
‘If he hadn’t done that, the evil would not have come about.’ But with 
what justification? Who knows the laws according to which society 
unfolds? I am sure even the cleverest has no idea. If you fight, you 
fight. If you hope, you hope.
Someone can fight, hope & even believe, without believing 
scientifically.30 
This is precisely the situation in the case of Hadji Murat. 
Although the story of his life may seem incoherent and foolish, 
a second look enables us to see it as a fight against what he 
considers as intolerable in various situations. And there is no 
point in saying ‘if you had fought against the Russians with your 
own people from the very beginning’ and so on; or else, ‘if you 
had remained faithful to your first alliance with the other side’, 
etc. For he takes his decisions on the basis of unforeseeable ‘social’ 
factors: the political jealousy of Shamil, who orders the capture 
of Hadji Murat at the time of his greatest success as a fighter; the 
Tsar’s absurd, cruel order to convert the campaign in the Caucasus 
into a war of extermination that affects his fellow countrymen, 
who do not understand his collaboration with the aggressors; the 
changing alliances of the invaders; and, finally, the failure of the 
Russians to keep their word about rescuing his family. Hadji Murat 
does not base his conduct on a calculation that presupposes the 
determination and predictability of human behaviour; instead, 
at each point he fights against what he considers intolerable, in 
principle on the basis of the moral code that he shares with his 
social milieu. The entire novella is studded with passages that 
emphasise this aspect, and at one point Hadji Murat expresses it 
in general terms when he is asked what he liked during the time 
when he was in Tiflis with the Russians: 
‘We have a saying … A dog asked a donkey to eat with him and 
gave him meat, the donkey asked the dog and gave him hay: they 
both went hungry … Every people finds its own ways good’.31 
30 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 69.
31 Tolstoy, Hadji Murat, p. 435.
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This reference to the moral code of the community to which one 
belongs implies other aspects that have to be taken into account, 
to which I now turn.
In his conversations with Rhees about ethics, Wittgenstein 
defended the fruitfulness of what might be called the 
‘anthropological method’ in philosophy32. In other words, 
imagining a tribe that behaves in such and such a way as one 
case of moral systems among others. However, the sociological 
description of the actions and valuations of various groups cannot 
contain the statement ‘such and such constitutes an advance’33; 
that is to say, it does not allow an external valuation from the 
perspective of our system. Moreover, in 1945 he declared to Rhees 
that describing the ways and customs of various tribes would 
not be an ethical discussion because ‘studying ways and customs 
would not be the same as studying rules or laws’34; in other words, 
those descriptions do not tell us how we should behave and the 
decisions that we should take in specific situations in which it 
makes sense to ask certain questions. Because, for example, that 
resolute fight against the intolerable, without any calculation, is 
a necessary but not sufficient consideration for considering Hadji 
Murat’s various actions morally. 
There is a section of the conversations with Rhees that is 
particularly relevant on this point. When Rhees asked him if he 
considered Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar a noble action (as Plutarch 
thought) or a diabolical one (as Dante thought), Wittgenstein 
replied that such a thing could not be discussed because ‘You 
would not know for your life what went on in his mind before he 
decided to kill Caesar. What he would have had to feel in order 
that you should say that killing his friend was noble’35. Moreover, 
those feelings might have to do with a sense of belonging, a link 
with a particular ethical system that we do not know. Rhees 
and Wittgenstein argued about a case: a man had come to the 
conclusion that he should either leave his wife or else abandon 
his work of cancer research because he considered the two 
32 Rush Rhees, ‘Some Developments in Wittgenstein’s View of Ethics’, The 
Philosophical Review, 74, no. 1 (1965), 17-26 (p. 25).
33 Wittgenstein, in Waismann, p. 15.
34 Wittgenstein, in Rhees, ‘Some Developments in…’, p. 24.
35 Ibid., p. 22.
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things incompatible. Wittgenstein said that if the man acted in 
accordance with Christian ethics (which must be understood here 
as morality, in accordance with the distinction that I made earlier), 
then there was no dilemma: in no case should he leave his wife, 
and so the problems were different (e.g., how to continue with his 
work as well as possible, how to behave with his wife in such a 
difficult situation, etc.). But if the question were posed in relation 
to a man who ‘does not have an ethics’ (which must be understood 
as meaning that he does not adhere to an established moral code), 
then, taking into consideration all the possible situations (that he 
stays with her and his work suffers, that although he leaves his 
work and loves her he turns out to be a bad, resentful husband, 
that by giving up his life he also wrecks his wife’s life, etc.), ‘Here 
we may say that we have all the materials of a tragedy; and we 
could only say: “Well, God help you”’36. In other words: good luck.
We cannot know Brutus’s speculations before he killed Caesar, 
but we do know Hadji Murat’s thoughts because Tolstoy sets them 
down as he constructs his narrative. Thus the reader is confronted 
with actions that are similar in appearance but have different 
meanings. On one occasion, the very first time that he faces death 
with Shamil’s followers, he sees his sworn brother fall dead and, 
fearing for his own life, he runs away. Later he says that he has 
only to remember that shame in order to fear nothing. Therefore 
every time that he flees subsequently it is not from fear but, for 
example in the final escape, in order to rescue his own people. 
On another occasion, however, Tolstoy takes care to specify that, 
before he flees from Shamil for the last time in order to go over to 
the Russian side, his lack of fear does not inspire nobler feelings 
in Hadji Murat: he does indeed imagine himself at the head of an 
army provided by the Russians with which to defend his life and 
avenge the deaths of his people in accordance with the code of his 
community, but he also cherishes the idea of a reward from the 
Tsar which will enable him to become governor of Avaria again 
and rule over the whole of Chechnya.
On the other hand, when he finally rejects Shamil’s pardon, 
decides to fight him and rescue his family, fleeing from the 
Russians forever, and in the attempt meets his death, Tolstoy also 
36 Ibid., p. 21.
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makes a point of describing Hadji’s very different thoughts. He 
remembers his childhood and his mother, picturing her not as the 
toothless, shabby captive of Shamil that she has now become. He 
remembers her when he was a child, clinging to her trousers as 
she took him to the fountain or being put in a basket to go and 
see his grandfather, a pious old craftsman who taught him to work 
with his hands and to pray. He remembers the first time that she 
shaved his head, just like the first time that he shaved the head of 
his eldest child, now held captive by Shamil, who wanted to put his 
eyes out. And he remembers her singing a song when she put him 
in the bed beside her, a song about an event in the life of Patimat, 
who was stabbed in the chest by her wrathful husband when she 
refused to be separated from Hadji Murat in order to be the wet 
nurse of the son of a khan: 
‘Your damask blade slashed open my white breast, but I pressed to 
it my darling boy, and washed him in my hot blood, and the wound 
healed without help of herbs and roots. I did not fear death, no more 
will my boy-djigit.’37 
To put it briefly, when he escapes for the last time in order to 
rescue his family Hadji Murat recalls the experience of feeling 
absolutely safe that Wittgenstein described in the ‘Lecture on 
Ethics’ as ‘the state of mind in which one is inclined to say “I am 
safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens”’38. One of the 
experiences with which he attempted to indicate the sphere of 
ethics considered not as ‘the general enquiry into what is good’ 
(Moore) but rather as the enquiry into the meaning of life or into 
what makes life worth living. At the end, when he is fighting to 
rescue his family, when he no longer belongs to the Russians or 
the Chechens but only to himself, when he no longer adheres to 
any precise code of reference, that is what he is fighting for. As 
Wittgenstein says in his notes:
Not funk but funk conquered is what is worthy of admiration & 
makes life worth having been lived. Courage, not cleverness; not even 
37 Tolstoy, Hadji Murat, p. 449.
38 Wittgenstein, ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, p. 8.
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inspiration, is the grain of mustard that grows up to be a great tree. 
To the extent there is courage, there is connection with life & death. 
[…] But it is not by recognizing the want of courage in someone else, 
that you acquire courage yourself.39 
This is a central aspect of the novella which I think attracted 
Wittgenstein’s attention powerfully: the figure of the tragic hero 
depicted by Hadji Murat. In the 1930s, speaking of the fear that he 
experiences when he is slightly ill and the feeling of the ‘breaking 
of a contract’ that God had made to leave him undisturbed, 
Wittgenstein laments that he finds it hard to endure this fear, 
which is what he would recommend to others, and he says: ‘One 
likes to see the hero in the other as a drama (that is performed for 
us) but to be even the least bit of a hero oneself leaves a different 
taste’40. So, as he writes a few years later, it is a weakness not to be 
a hero, but it is a much greater weakness 
to play the hero, thus not even to have the strength to clearly & 
without ambiguity acknowledge the deficit on the balance sheet. 
And that means: to become modest: not in a few words which one 
says once but in life.41 
Once again, therefore, we find the lesson that he drew from 
the story ‘Two Old Men’, on which he commented to Engelmann 
in the years of the 1914–18 war: no excuses, either to oneself or 
to others. After the Second World War, probably thinking of his 
own experience of fighting, Wittgenstein returned to the theme 
of heroism: 
A hero looks death in the face, real death, not just a picture of 
death. Behaving decently in a crisis does not mean being able to act 
the part of a hero well, as in the theatre, it means rather being able 
to look death itself in the eye.42 
39 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, pp. 43–44 (1940).
40 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Movements of Thought’, in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions, 
ed. by James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003), p. 63.
41 Ibid., p. 163.
42 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 58 (1946).
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And that is precisely what Hadji Murat does after feeling 
ashamed at having run away when his sworn brother fell dead 
in an unequal fight with Shamil’s men. That is his attitude once 
again when he decides to abandon the Russians and escape to 
the mountains in order to fight against that leader and rescue his 
family. And that is also how he dies, fighting without hope but 
with a feeling of indifference, and he remembers the song about a 
fighter, Hamzad, who before dying in a situation similar to his own 
sings about the radical nature of death: 
You birds of the air, fly to our homes and tell our sisters, our 
mothers and fair maidens that we died for the ghazavat. Tell them 
our bodies shall lie in no grave, our bones will be carried off and 
gnawed by ravening wolves and black crows will pick out our eyes.43
However, there is not only one way of embodying this heroic 
view. Wittgenstein considers it in a relative way, historically and 
individually. A deed performed in other times may now rightly 
be considered an act of heroism. But it does not depend on the 
practical aspects of the action which can be described externally, 
for what decides whether an action is heroic is its ‘greatness’, 
which is determined by its ‘significance’, ‘by the pathos which is 
associated with the way of acting’. It is not the way of acting but 
the pathos associated with it that decides what is heroic. However, 
the fact is that different times and peoples (Wittgenstein speaks 
of ‘race’) associate their pathos with particular ways of acting, 
and people who are unaware of this are led astray and continue 
to think that what is decisive is the external description of the 
behaviour. Yet when a ‘transvaluation of values’ takes place and 
pathos is associated with another way of acting, then it can be 
seen that what was previously considered heroic is now no longer 
heroic, even though it may remain in circulation for some time, 
like ‘worthless bills’44. 
I think that, for Wittgenstein, in the character of Hadji Murat 
there were – to continue with the simile – old bills – which he 
could use to practise his anthropological method – and bills still 
43 Tolstoy, Hadji Murat, pp. 448–449.
44 Wittgenstein, Public and Private Occasions, pp. 31–33.
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in circulation. Basically, one: his way of going on doggedly through 
life, the overcoming of fear, his calm, temperate attitude, cold and 
at the same time passionate, distanced and ultimately indifferent 
even to the challenges that death in its various guises presents 
to him. At the beginning of Tolstoy’s story the narrator finds a 
Tartar thistle as he is walking and exclaims: ‘But what strength 
and vigour, I thought, recalling the effort it had cost me to pluck 
it. How stoutly it defended itself, and how dearly it sold its life’45. 
And in the last chapter, referring to the slain warrior, the story 
ends with an evocation of a thistle that had been crushed by a cart 
wheel: ‘This was the death that was brought to my mind by the 
crushed thistle in the ploughed field’46. 
Yet a further aspect of this character must have attracted 
Wittgenstein. For Hadji Murat is a man who has lost his roots, 
like the falcon in the tale told in the hills that, significantly, he 
remembers before his final departure in order to rescue his family. 
When the falcon returns to the free falcons in the mountains after 
the time that he has spent with human beings the other falcons 
will not accept him because of the silver bells on his legs; but the 
falcon that had been in captivity wants to stay in the mountains 
and his fellow falcons kill him. In the fragment Licht und 
Schatten Wittgenstein speaks of the case of a man who reaches 
the boundaries of his culture and confronts it: ‘then it is that 
confrontation, its type and intensity, that interests us in him, that 
takes hold of us in his work. The more great the more intensely, 
the less great the less intensely’47. 
In his memories of his conversations with Wittgenstein, 
Engelmann speaks of the importance that Wittgenstein attributed 
to the ‘happy end’ in Westerns (and in films in general). A film 
seemed to him to be the acting out of a wish-fulfilment dream 
and therefore had to end with the satisfying of the wish expressed 
in the dream. However, in order to make Wittgenstein’s opinion 
credible Engelmann adds something on his own account. Taking 
as his starting point Hölderlin’s distich about Oedipus Rex – ‘Many 
have failed to find words for highest joy’s joyous expression, / Here 
45 Tolstoy, Hadji Murat, p. 338.
46 Ibid., p. 464.
47 Ibid., p. 57.
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we find it at last, here in sorrow expressed’ – Engelmann compares 
the tragic end to what seems to be its opposite, the happy ending. 
For whether the transitory moving effect has to do with one type of 
human being or with the public in general, the tragic end shows, 
in the form of grief, that which is most joyous; in other words, ‘the 
victory of man’s loftiest aspirations over the base side of his nature, 
a victory he can attain and seal only through his own death’48. 
And this is so in the case of Hadji Murat, a dynamic series of 
pictures in prose that is almost like a Western from Hollywood’s 
golden age.
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